Where the Money Goes — MacDowell Funding Flow Analysis

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Michigan school funding follows a per-pupil model. State aid flows to the school based on enrollment. How schools allocate that funding determines what students actually receive. This analysis compares MacDowell Preparatory Academy’s spending patterns to state benchmarks and peer schools.

Spending Comparison

CategoryState Target %MacDowell Actual %Delta
Instruction (teacher salaries, classroom)55-65%32.1%-23 to -33 points
Administration8-12%19.4%+7 to +11 points
Operations & Maintenance8-12%12.6%Near normal
Instructional Support5-8%13.6%Above range
All Other10-15%22.3%Above range

The instruction line is 32.1% — well-run schools spend 55-65% on instruction. The missing 23-33 cents of every dollar is going to administration and the management company instead of the classroom.

Source: MDE financial reports, FY2025 audit data.

The Purpose Group Fee Structure

flowchart LR
    A["State Aid<br/>$4.9M"] --> B["MacDowell Preparatory Academy"]
    B --> C["Purpose Group LLC<br/>72.67% of revenue"]

From the management agreement (OCR’d from FOIA):

ProvisionDetail
Section 5.110% of Gross State School Aid ≈ $490K/year management fee
Section 5.3ALL operating costs reimbursed to Purpose Group
Section 5.2“No Related Parties” clause — violated on its face because Banks is sole member of Purpose Group AND superintendent of the school
Registered address1968 Severn Road, Grosse Pointe Woods (Banks’ personal residence)

The fee + cost reimbursement structure means Purpose Group can never lose money. The school absorbs all financial risk. Purpose Group absorbs all surplus.

What $4.9M Buys

MetricValueSource
Math proficiency3%MDE, SchoolDigger
Reading proficiency12%U.S. News
Statewide rankBottom 3% (1,443 of 1,488)SchoolDigger
Properly credentialed staff2 of 14 (14%)MOECS audit Sep 26, 2026
Admin cost per student$1,665 (vs. ~$850 state avg)MDE FY2025
Revenue to management LLC72.67%Financial records

The Self-Dealing Structure

The management agreement creates a structural conflict of interest:

  1. Banks is sole member of Purpose Group LLC (the management company)
  2. Banks is superintendent of the school (hired by the management company)
  3. Banks controls the Purpose Foundation (the 501(c)(3))
  4. Purpose Group’s address is Banks’ home in Grosse Pointe Woods
  5. The management agreement’s “no related parties” clause is violated by the structure itself
flowchart TD
    A["Brian Banks"] --> B["controls Purpose Group LLC"]
    B --> C["manages MacDowell"]
    A --> D["is superintendent of MacDowell"]
    D --> E["hired by Purpose Group"]
    A --> F["controls Purpose Foundation"]
    F --> G["receives tax-deductible donations"]
    H["All three entities"] --> I["same controller, same beneficiary"]

The Authorization Incentive

DPSCD (Detroit Public Schools Community District) receives a 3% authorization fee from MacDowell’s state aid — approximately $147K/year. This creates a financial incentive to authorize and maintain charter schools, regardless of performance. DPSCD authorized PCA despite Banks’ 9 criminal convictions and MacDowell’s bottom-3% ranking.

Verify It Yourself

Every financial figure in this analysis is drawn from public records filed with the Michigan Department of Education and LARA. Clone the repository and verify independently.